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+ THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
+ Report of Congressional Committees on the Iran-Contra Affair
100th Congress, 1st Session
H. Rept. No 100-433 S. Rept. No. 100-216
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
with
Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views
November 1987
U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Senate Select Committee
Select Committee to Investigate On Secret Military Assistance to Iran
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran And the Nicaraguan Opposition
- Preface - Orgins of This Report
+ Section I: The Report
+ Part I Executive Summary
Executive Summary..3
Summary of the Facts..3
Nicaragua..3
Iran..6
The Coverup..9
Findings & Conclusions..11
Policy Contradictions & Failures..11
Flawed Policy Process..12
Confusion..13
—The President first told the Tower Board that he had
approved the initial Israeli shipments. Then, he told the Tower Board
that he had not. Finally, he told the Tower Board that he does not
know whether he approved the initial Israeli arms shipments, and his
top advisers disagree on the question.
—The President claims he does not recall signing a Finding
approving the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran. But
Poindexter testified that the President did sign a Finding on December
5, 1985 approving the shipment retroactively. Poindexter later
destroyed the Finding to save the President from embarassment.
—The President and the Attorney General told the public that
the President did not know about the November 1985 Israeli HAWK
shipment until February 1986—an error the White House Chief of
Staff explained by saying that the preparation for the press
conference "sort of confused the Presidential mind."
—North says he sent five or six sompleted memorandums to
Poindexter seeking the President's approval for the diversion.
Poindexter does not remember receiving any. Only one has been
found.
Dishonesty & Secrecy..13
North admitted that he and other officials lied repeatedly to
Congress and to the American people about the Contra covert action
and Iran arms sales, and that he altered and destroyed official
documents. North's testimony demonstrates that he also lied to
members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney General,
and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC.
Secrecy became an obsession. Congress was never informed
of the Iran or the Contra covert actions, notwithstanding the
requirement in the law that Congress be notified of all covert actions
in a "timely fashion."
Poindexter and North cited fear of leaks as a justification for
these practices. But the need to prevent public disclosure cannot
justify the deception practiced upon Members of Congress and
Executive branch officials by those who knew of the arms sales to
Iran and of the Contra support network.
... Congress cannot fulfill its legislative responsibilities if it
is denied information because members of the Executive branch, who
place their faith in a band of international arms merchants and
financiers, unilaterally declare Congress unworthy of trust.
It was not operational security that motivated such
conduct—not when our own Government was the victim. Rather, the
NSC staff feared, correctly, that any disclosure to Congress or the
Cabinet of the arms-for-hostages and arms-for-profit activities
would produce a storm of outrage.
The Administration never sought to hide its desire to assist
the Contras so long as such aid was authorized by statute. On the
contrary, it wanted the Sandinistas to know that the United States
supported the Contras. After enactment of the Boland Amendment,
the Administration repeatedly and publicly called upon Congress to
resume U.S. assistance. Only the NSC staff's Contra support
activities were kept under wraps. The Committees believe these
actions were concealed in order to prevent Congress from learning
that the Boland Amendment was being circumvented.
Privitization..15
... Funds denied by Congress were obtained by the
Administration from third countries and private citizens.
The solicitation of foreign funds by an Administration to
pursue foreign policy goals rejected by Congress is dangerous and
improper.
Moreover, under the Constitution only Congress can provide
funds for the Executive branch. The Framers intended Congress's
"power of the purse" to be one of the principal checks on Executive
action. It was designed, among other things, to prevent the Executive
from involving this country unilaterally in a foreign conflict. The
Constitutional plan does not prohibit a President from asking a foreign
state, or anyone else, to contribute funds to a third party. But it
does prohibit such solicitation where the United States exercises
control over their receipt and expenditure. By circumventing
Congress' power of the purse through third-country and private
contributions to the Contras, the Administration undermined a
cardinal principle of the Constitution.
Covert operations of this Government should only be directed
and conducted by the trained professional services that are
accountable to the President and Congress. Such operations should
never be delegated, as they were here, to private citizens in order to
evade Governmental restrictions.
Lack of Accountability..16
The confusion, deception, and privitization which marked the
Iran-Contra Affair were the inevitable products of an attempt to avoid
accountability. Congress, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
denied information and excluded from the decision-making process.
Democratic procedures were disregarded.
Officials who make public policy must be accountable to the public.
But the public cannot hold officials accountable for policies of which the
public is unaware. Policies that are known can be subjected to the test of
reason, and mistakes can be corrected after consultation with the
Congress and deliberation within the Executive branch itself. Policies that
are secret become the private preserve of the few, mistakes are
inevitably perpetuated, and the public loses control over Government.
That is what happened in the Iran-Contra Affair:
—The President's NSC staff carried out a covert action in
furtherance of his policy to sustain the Contras, but the President said he
did not know about it.
—The President's NSC staff secretly diverted millions of dollars in
profits from the Iran arms sales to the Contras, but the President said he
did not know about it and Poindexter claimed he did not tell him.
—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not informed of
the Iran arms sales, nor was he ever consulted regarding the impact of
such sales on the Iran-Iraq war or on US military readiness.
—The Secretary of State was not informed of the millions of
dollars in Contra contributions solicited by the NSC staff from foreign
governments with which the State Department deals each day.
—Congress was told almost nothing—and what it was told was
false.
Deniability replaced accountability. Thus, Poindexter justified his
decision not to inform the President of the diversion on the ground that he
wanted to give the President "deniability." Poindexter said he wanted to
shield the President from political embarrassment if the diversion became
public.
This kind of thinking is inconsistent with democratic governance.
"Plausible denial," an accepted concept in intelligence activities, means
structuring an authorized covert operation so that, if discovered by the
party against whom it is directed, US involvement may plausibly be
denied. That is a legitimate feature of authorized covert operations. In no
circumstance, however, does "plausible denial" mean structuring an
operation so that it may be concealed from—or denied to—the highest
elected officials of the United States Government itself.
The very premise of democracy is that "we the people" are
entitled to make our own choices on fundamental policies. But freedom of
choice is illusory if policies are kept, not only from the public, but from
its elected representatives.
Intelligence Abuses..17
Covert Operations..17
The NSC Staff..17
Disdain for Law..18
In the Iran-Contra Affair, officials viewed the law not as setting
boundaries for their actions, but raising impediments to their goals.
—The covert program of support for the Contras evaded the
Constitution's most significant check on Executive power: the President
can spend funds on a program only if he can convince Congress to
appropriate the money.
When Congress enacted the Boland Amendment, cutting off funds
for the war in Nicaragua, Administration officials raised funds for the
Contras from other sources—foreign Governments, the Iran arms sales,
and private individuals; and the NSC staff controlled the expenditures of
these funds through power over the Enterprise. Conducting the covert
program in Nicaragua with funding from the sale of U.S. Government
property and contributions raised by Government officials was a flagrant
violation of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.
The President set the stage by welcoming a huge donation for the
Contras from a foreign Government—a contribution clearly intended to
keep the Contras in the field while U.S. aid was barred. The NSC staff
thereafter solicited other foreign Governments for military aid,
facilitated the efforts of U.S. fundraisers to provide lethal assistance to
the Contras, and ultimately developed and directed a private network that
conducted, in North's words, a "full service covert operation" in support
of the Contras.
—North's [operation was] required to be disclosed to the
Intelligence Committees of Congress under Section 501 of tne National
Security Act. No such disclosure was made.
—By Executive order, a covert operation requires a personal
determination by the President before it can be conducted by an agency
other than the CIA. It requires a written Finding before any agency can
carry it out. In the case of North's [operation], there was no such
personal determination and no such Finding. In fact, the president
disclaims any knowledge of this covert action.
—False statements to Congress are felonies if made with
knowledge and intent. Several Administration officials gave statements
denying NSC staff activities in support of the Contras which North later
described in his testimony as "false," and "misleading, evasive, and
wrong."
...the Committees reject any notion that worthy ends justify
violations of law by Government officials; and the Committees condemn
without reservation the making of false statements to Congress and the
withholding, shredding, and alteration of documents relevant to a pending
inquiry.
... There is no place in Government for law breakers.
Congress & the President..19
The Constitution of the United States gives important powers to
both the President and the Congress in the making of foreign policy. The
President is the principal architect of foreign policy in consultation with
the Congress....
Yet, in the Iran-Contra Affair, Administration officials holding no
elected office repeatedly evidenced disrespect for Congress' efforts to
perform its Constitutional oversight role in foreign policy:
—Poindexter testified, referring to his efforts to keep the covert
action in support of the Contras from Congress: "I simply did not want any
outside interference."
—North testified: "I didn't want to tell Congress anything" about
this covert action.
—Abrams acknowledged in his testimony that, unless Members of
Congressional Committees asked "exactly the right question, using
exactly the right words, they weren't going to get the right answers,"
regarding solicitation of third-countries for Contra support.
—And numerous other officials made false statements to, and
misled, the Congress.
Who Was Responsible..20
North
Poindexter
McFarlane
Casey
Bush
There is no evidence that the Vice President was aware of the
diversion. The Vice President attended several meetings on the Iran
initiative, but none of the participants could recall his views.
The Vice President said he did not know of the Contra resupply
operation. His National Security Adviser, Donald Gregg, was told in early
August 1986 by a former colleague that North was running the Contra
resupply operation, and that ex-associates of Edwin Wilson—a well known
ex-CIA official convicted of selling arms to Libya and plotting the murder
of his prosecutors—were involved in the operation. Gregg testified that he
did not consider these facts worthy of the Vice President's attention and
did not report them to him, even after the Hasenfus airplane was shot
down and the Administration had denied any connection with it.
Meese
Reagan
+ Part II Central America ch.1—7
1 Intro: Background on US-Nicaragua Relations..25
The Sandinistas Take Over..27
Tne Contras..27
2 NSC Staff Takes Contra Policy Underground..31
The December 1981 Finding..31
Pastora defects..32
A proposal for a new finding..32
Boland I..32
Admin. Responds to Congr. Unrest: May-Sept. 1983..33
White propaganda..34
office of Public Diplomacy for Lat. Amer & Caribb est.
secret op ed pieces in major papers
The CIA tries to stockpile..34
Sept 1983 finding: a new rationale for covert aid..35
Forcing Issue: Dec. Funding cap & Intensfyng Covert Oper..35
Decision to bring the situation to a head..36
The role of Lt. Col. Oliver North..36
Tension between the 1983 finding & intensified operations..36
The Money begins to run out..37
The harbor mining disclosures
Keeping Contras Together: Spring-Summer 1984..37
Tapping foreign sources-the first efforts
Looking to country 1 for Contra support..38
Looking to country 6 for Contra support..38
Country 2 contributes funds..39
June National Security Planning Group meeting..39
attending
Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger,Casey, Meese, McFarlane.
Casey urges Pres. seek 3rd country aid for Contras.
Shultz responds that Chief of Staff James Baker had told him that if
the US Gov acted as a conduit for 3rd country funding to the Contras,
that would be an "impeachable offense."
McFarlane had already secured aid from country 2
Providing support-the private network
Secord's initial role
Owen's role
Boland II..41
Contra Aid: Fall-Winter 1984-85..42
Arms shipments begin & blowpipes are sought..42
Providing Intelligence & military advice..43
Singlaub efforts with countries 3 & 5..44
Country 2 makes an additional contribution..45
Contra Aid: Winter-Spring 1985..45
The administration returns to Congress..45
Weapons shipments from the Enterprise continue..46
Disbursements to other Contra leaders
Keeping the Operation Secret..47
Covert Operation & Legislative Strategy Intertwine..48
Admin. responds to Congressional Defeat..49
Maintaining the Covert Operation..49
Secord Group & it's Competition..50
Calero Tries Singlaub..51
references..52
3 Enterprise Assumes Control of Contra Support..59
Enterprise's Mission is expanded..59
The new humanitarian aid..61
Preparations for the resupply operation..61
US support for the covert operation..61
The airfield is planned..61
The airbase is secured..62
Country 3 comes through..63
The link with NHAO..63
NHAO - Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
New legislation-Congressional support increases..64
Poindexter visits Central America..64
Continued funding problems..64
Legislative plans and a new finding..64
The resupply operation begins..65
The President meets a Costa Rican official..65
Lethal deliveries begin..66
The resupply operation steps up its activities..67
Dutton's reorganization plan..68
The Southern front resupply..68
Altern. funding sources:North's response to Congr. action..69
The money: Third country assistance..69
An aborted solicitation..69
The May 16, 1986 NSPG meeting..70
Felix Rodriguez becomes disaffected..71
New legislation..72
Selling assets to the CIA..72
The resupply operation is interrupted..73
The resupply operation resumes..74
North Expands his special operations..75
The operation begins to unravel:disclosure of airstrip..76
The covert operation ends..77
Presidential authorization & knowledge..77
Conclusion..78
table 3-1 Resupply flights by North/Secord operation-1986..79-81
references..82-84
4 Private Fundraising: Channell-Miller Operation..85
The background..85
Carl R. "Spitz" Channell..85
Daniel L. Conrad..86
Richard R. Miller and IBC
IBC - International Business Communications
NRF dinner..88
NRF Nicaraguan Refugee Fund
NEPL & IBC meet..88
NEPL-National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
Channell-Miller network-the beginnings..88
The initial solicitations..89
North's maiden presentation..90
The establishment of I.C., Inc..90
The creation of the network..91
Channell-Miller network-the operation..91
White House bridfings & Hay-Adams Gatherings..91
Nrth's invlv. in Solict. intnded for pchse lethl spplys..92
The role of the President..96
The Role of David Fischer & Martin Artiano..96
North's other fundraising efforts..97
What happened to the money..98
Political advertising for the Contras..98
Channell-Miller network-the end..99
The beginning of the end..99
The Lowell Sun allegations..99
NEPL activities in December 1986..99
February 1987 report from IBC to NEPL..100
Guilty pleas of Channel & Miller..100
Figure 4-1 Channell-Miller Contra Assistance Network..101
References..102
5 NSC Staff Involvement in Criminal Investigations & Prosecutions..105
North & the Customs Service..105
Maule Aircraft Corporation..105
Kelso..106
Miami Neutrality Investigation..106
The roots of the investigation..106
Garcia Allegations..106
Activity in Washington..107
Terrell & Costa Rica..107
April 4 meeting..108
The Meese aside..108
The Feldman Memoranda..108
Further investigation..109
Reward for a Friend..109
The Fake Prince..110
Instigation of Investigations..112
Summary..113
references..114
6 Keeping USG Fingerprints Off Contra Operation: 1984-85..117
1983-84:Suspicions, & the "Casey Accords"..117
1984:testimony before Cong. on 3rd-country assistance..118
Early 1985:2nd country 2 contribution..120
Casey briefing of Senate Intelligence Committee..121
Deflecting media inquiries..121
June-Aug '85:Press reports on NSC staff & Contra support..121
Denials..122
Summer & Fall Aug '85: Congressional Inquiries..122
Responses to Congress: The McFarlane Letters..122
First reaction: conceal the facts..123
The six "troubling" memos..124
12/4/84:"Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance"..124
2/6/85: "Nicaraguan Arms Shipment"..124
3/5/85: "[Central Amer. Country's] aid to Nicarg. Resist."..124
3/16/85:"Fallback Plan for the Nicarg. Resist."..125
4/11,85:"FDN Military Operations"..125
5/31/85:"Nicarg. Resist. Near-Term Outlook"..125
Undiscovered documents..125
McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions..126
Responses to Congress: The Denials..127
Fundraising..127
Military Assistance..127
McFarlane's meetings with Members..128
McFarlane-Barnes Document Dispute..129
McFarlane's 1986 Testimony..130
McFarlane's testimony on North's activities in 1986..130
Testimony on fundraising activities..131
Testimony on 1985 activities..132
Summer 1985: Inquiry of the Intelligence Oversight Board..132
Summary..133
references.. 134
7 Keeping USG Fingerprints Off Contra Operation: 1986..137
January to June 1986: Press Reports..137
Focus on North..137
Concern for Secrecy..138
June 1986: New Congressional Inquiry..139
The executive's response..140
August 1986: North's Meeting with Members of Congress..141
Authority to lie..141
September 1986: The Santa Elena Airfield..142
Airfield revealed: damage control..143
The Hasenfus Downing..144
The US Government connection..144
The initial response..144
The denials..145
Abram's Brunei Testimony..148
Conclusion..149
Reasons for the Deception..150
references..151
+ Part III The Arms Sales to Iran ch.8—16
8 US-Iran Relations & Hostages in Lebanon..157
No regional guarantees..157
Arms Sales to Iran..157
Fig 8-1 Map of Iran..158
Operation Staunch..159
Iran's Support of Terrorism..159
Hostage-taking begins..160
references..162
9 Iran Arms Sales: The Beginning..163
The Actors Take Their Places..163
Ghorbanifar..163
Ghorbanifar proposes to ransom the hostages..164
Ghorbanifar tries again..164
Ledeen gets involved..165
The NSC Reconsiders Iran Policy..165
The discussions continue..166
The President is informed..166
The Israeli arms sales are authorized..167
Preparations for the delivery..168
Israeli ships 96 TOWs-but no hostage is released..168
NSC staff limits distribution of intelligence..169
Replenishment..169
The initiative continues: the ante is upped..169
Meeting in Europe, October 1985..170
The Lessons of the First Arms Shipment..170
references..171
10 Arms to Iran: A Shipment of HAWKs Ends in Failure..175
Ledeen Brings Home a Plan..175
North-Nir Dialogue begins..175
McFarlane briefs CIA..176
McFarlane gives Rabin the go-ahead..176
McFarlane briefs the President..176
The November HAWK Shipment..177
How many missiles?..176
McFarlane puts North in charge..177
McFarlane informs the President and the Secretary of State..178
North recruits Secord..178
Million-dollar deposit to Lake Resources..179
Confusion in country 15..179
North updates Poindexter..180
North asks the CIA for assistance..180
North brings State into the operation..181
Jumbo jet departs for country 15 transit point..181
North & Clarridge bring in a CIA airline..181
Clarridge brings in another CIA chief..182
Schwimmer's DC-8 charter falls through..182
Clarridge's office becomes the command post..182
The oil-drilling equipment cover story..183
Country 15 routing is abandoned..183
CIA airline porprietary moves the missiles..184
Aftetmath of the HAWK Flight..185
The failure sinks in..185
The President renews his approval..186
The Iranians feel cheated..187
Money flows back and forth..187
Conclusion..188
references..189
11 Clearing Hurdles: The President Approves a New Plan..193
The Players Change..193
North looks for weapons..194
North lays out a plan..194
The President Signs a Finding..195
Poindexter briefs Shultz..197
North raises Contra diversion with Israelis..197
The President and his advisers review the initiative..197
Fig. 11-1. Organization Chart of the CIA..196
Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Council
General Counsel
Inspector General
Office of legislative Liaison
Director of Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Public Affairs Office
Comptroller
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Office of Reasearch & Development
Office of Development & Engineering
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Office of SIGINT Operations
Office of Technical Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Office of Soviet Analysis
Office of European Analysis
Office of Near Eastern & South Asian Analysis
Office of East Asian Analysis
Office of African & Latin American Analysis
Office of Scientific & Weapons Research
Office of Global Issues
Office of Imagery Analysis
Office of Current Production & Analytic Support
Office of Central Reference
Deputy Director for Administration
Office of Medical Services
Office of Security
Office of Training & Education
Office of Finance
Office of Logistics
Office of Information Services
Office of Information Technology
Office of Communications
Office of Personnel/ OEEO
McFarlane Meets Ghorbanifar in London..199
McFarlane briefs the President on the London Meeting..199
Poindexter to North: Keep Trying..200
The CIA evaluates Ghorbanifar..200
Acceleration of the Initiative: January 1986..201
Nir comes to Washington..210
Nir & North discuss use of residuals..201
A new finding is prepared..202
The President and advisers consider the new proposal..203
North proceeds with plans for replenishment..203
Legal problems identified with replenishment approach..205
Ghorbanifar fails polygraph..205
Restructuring the deal..206
President signs a new finding..208
Conclusion..209
references..210
12 Arms Sales to Iran: The United States Takes Control..213
The Finding Is Implemented..213
The Army executes the tasking..215
Pricing the TOW missiles..215
The London meeting..215
The February Shipment..217
The first Frankfurt meeting..218
The meeting with an Iranian official..219
The second installment of TOWs is delivered..219
The diversion continues..221
The Initiative Continues..221
Cave joins the team..222
New doubts about Ghorbanifar..223
Ghorbanifar visits Washington..224
Planning the Tehran mission..225
North's diversion memorandum..225
Complications..226
Pricing the HAWK parts..227
New Demands..227
The State Department hears rumors..228
Another meeting in London..229
Cave becomes concerned about pricing..230
The Meeting Is Set..231
The National Security Planning Group meeting..231
Final planning for Tehran..231
US war readiness suffers..232
Conclusion..233
references..234
13 Deadlock in Tehran..237
Preparing for the Mission..237
Arrival in Tehran..238
The misunderstanding..238
Days 1 & 2—marking time..238
The final days—McFarlane remains firm..239
Departure..241
Why the Tehran Mission Failed..242
references..243
14 "Taken to the Cleaners": The Iran Initiative Continues..245
The Bartering Continues..245
Iran Discovers the Overcharge..245
Trying for an Independence Day Present..246
The Da'wa Prisoners.. 247
Crowe Is Apprised..247
The Vice President is Briefed..247
A New Deal in London..248
The Microfiche Arrives..248
The Search for a New Channel..249
The Second Channel's Debut..249
Two Trains Running..250
Second Channel Out Front..250
Secord/Hakim Ascending..250
Nir Suspects..251
In "Great Satan's" Parlor..251
Preparations for Frankfurt..253
Chasing the Horizon—Frankfurt, October 6—8..254
Ambassador Extraordinaire..256
Arms Transfer Preparations..258
Arming the Guards..259
Mainz Meeting..259
The Release of Jacobsen..261
Exposure..251
Taking Stock in Geneva..262
The Circle Opens..262
The Finale..263
references..264
15 The Diversion..269
Whose Idea?..269
Figure 15—1. Exhibit JKS—6: 3 Way trade..270
Who Else Knew—a Study in Contradictions..271
Presidential knowledge..271
Casey's knowledge..273
How Much Was Diverted?..274
references..275
16 Summary: The Iran Initiative..277
The Attorney General's Advice..278
The Hostage Objective..278
The Position of Israel..279
The Contra Objective..280
The Profit Objective..280
references..281
+ Part IV Exposure and Concealment ch.17—20
17 Exposure & Concealment: Introduction..285
18 October 1986: Exposure Threatened..287
The Hasenfus Plane is Shot Down..287
North tries to slow the FBI investigation of SAT..287
SAT=Southern Air Transport, a former CIA proprietary charter airline
based in Miami, Fl.
North tries to slow the Customs investigation of SAT..287
Poindexter tries to slow the investigations..288
House com. seeks indepen. counsl to investig. Hasenfus crash..288
Furmark Visits the CIA: Talk of "Diversion"..288
The Travelers Check Ledger..290
The Fall Guy Plan..291
references..292
19 November 1986: Concealment..293
The Admin's Initial Response to Arms Sales Disclosures..293
The Shultz/Poindexter Cables..293
The Public Denials Continue..294
The November 10 Meeting at the White House..294
Phase 2 of the Admin Response: Limited Disclosure..295
Preparing for the President's address to the nation..295
The President addresses the nation..296
Events Between Nov.13 & Nov.19 News Conference..296
The President's Nov.10 News Conference..297
The President & Secretary of State Meet on Nov.20..298
The NSC Staff's Chronologies..298
Casey & Poindexter Prepare for Congress..301
Poindexter, Casey, & the Intelligence Committees: Nov. 21
references..304
20 November 1986: The Attorney General's Inquiry..305
The Attorney General's Inquiry Is Launched..305
The NSC staff responds by altering & destroying evidence..306
November 22: Diversion Is Discovered..309
November 23: Investigation & Obstruction Continue..311
November 24: Informing the President..313
November 25: The Public Learns of the Diversion..316
November 25: the Attorney General's press conference..317
November 26: Criminal Investigation Underway..319
November 27: A Thanksgiving Phone Call..320
Final Steps..320
References..322
+ Part V The Enterprise ch.21—23
21 Introduction to the Enterprise..327
By the summner of 1986, the organization that Richard Secord ran at Lt. Col.
Oliver L. North's direction controlled 5 aircraft, including C-123 and C-7
transports. It had an airfield in one country, warehouse facilities at an airbase in
another, a stockpile of guns and military equipment to drop by air to the Contras,
and secure communications equipment obtained by North from the National Security
Agency.(NSA)
...This private air force was but a part of the organization that Secord and
Hakim called the "Enterprise."
...To Hakim, Secord's partner, the Enterprise was a covert organization
with a chain of command headed by North. Secord...testified that it was fair to
describe the Enterprise as his won covert operations organization formed at the
request of North and Poindexter to carry out all of the operations described in his
testimony.
Secord consistently turned to the same group of individuals in order to
accomplish the tasks that North assigned to him. Albert Hakim, an Iranian-born
American citizen, was his partner and, by agreement, Secord and Hakim were to
share equally in any Enterprise profits. Hakim controlled the Enterprise's bank
accounts. Rafael Quintero, a Cuban exile formerly associated with the CIA, handled
the logistics of arms deliveries from various locations in Central America. Glenn
Robinette, a former CIA officer-turned-consultant, investigated those who made
accusations about operations of the Enterprise and performed other tasks, among
them, installation of a security system at North's residence. Thomas Clines, a
former CIA official-turned-investor and consultant, served as the primary broker
for the Enterprise's arms transactions.
...Secord, as an Air Force officer, and Clines, as a CIA officer, worked
together in the late 1960's when both were assigned to the CIA station in Laos...
When Secord returned from Laos he was stationed at the Pentagon. Clines
took the opportunity to introduce him to a number of Clines' CIA associates,
including Quintero. Clines also introduced Secord to Edwin Wilson, a former CIA
officer who had become enormously successful in international business
dealings.(18) In the Mid 1970's, Secord was stationed in Iran where he exercised
substantial influence over purchasing decisions of the Iranian Air Force.
After Secord returned from Iran, his relationship with Wilson became more
involved. In 1981, Secord and Clines became subjects of a Department of Justice
conflict-of-interest and bribery investigation stemming from their relationship
with Wilson. In addition, in 1982, Clines became a target of a Department of
Justice investigation concerning fraudulent overbillings of the US Government by
the Egyptian American Transport Company (EATSCO), 49% of which was owned by
Clines.
Secord retired from the Air Force in May 1983 because the Wilson story
and the ongoing Justice Department investigation had placed a cloud over his
military career. Two months later, EATSCO pleaded guilty to criminal and civil
overbilling charges. Clines, on behalf of the corporate entity that held his 49%
interest, paid a $10,000 criminal fine and a $100,000 civil fine as part of the
settlement. In July 1984 the Justice Department closed the EATSCO case and in
January 1986, it closed the conflict-of-interest and bribery investigation of
Secord and Clines. No indictment or other prosecutorial action followed.
Secord...in May 1983, immediately upon his retirement, joined Hakim.
Secord became Hakim's equal partner in a new company, Stanford Technology
Trading Group International (STTGI), headquartered in Vienna, Virginia, outside of
Washington, D.C. STTGI, relying on Secord's contacts, tried to develop contracts in
the security field in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
references..329
18. FB389-92. The Principal source of Wilson's wealth turned out to be arms
deals. During 1983, Wilson was convicted of conspiring to sell arms and
explosives to Libya as well as conspiring to murder the federal prosecutor and
6 witnesses in his trial. Washington Post, 1/10/84, and A4. See generally,
Washington Post, 3/14/83, at A17.
22 The Enterprise..331
Section 1:Swiss Connection, Secret Accounts & Covert Charter..332`
Figure 22—1.Exhibit AH—1: Diagram of the Enterprise..334
Section 2: Income Generation..335
Table 22—1. Enterprise income 1985 & 1986 ($47.96M)..336
Figure 22—2. Enterprise Income ($47.96 Million)..336
The cash balances..337
Table 22—2. Estimated ending monthly cash balances..337
Section 3: Expenditures..337
Table 22—3. Enterprise Expenditures..337
Central American expenditures..338
Figure 22—3. Enterprise Expendit. Dec.1984—Dec.1986 ($35.77M)..339
Figure 22—4. Expenditures Relating to Contras ($16.5M)..340
The mideast:expenditures for the Iran operations..341
Worldwide projects..341
The North residence security system..341
Unexplained cash expenditures..343
Section 4: The Diversion—How Much?..343
Section 5: Profits—Who Made What..343
Breaking the code names..343
Korel assets..344
"Button"..344
The surplus..345
Figure 22—5. Breakdown of $12.19M Surplus..346
The commissions..347
Table 22—4.Mark-up on Arms Purchased for Contras (CSF Ledgers)..347
CSF = Compagnie de Services Fiduciaires. The Enterprise's records were
maintained by CSF, a Swiss fiduciary company, owned and administered
on a daily basis by Willard I. Zucker, a US citizen and former IRS lawyer
who has resided in Switzerland for 20 years.
Table 22—5. Commissions on Arms Sales to Contras..348
Other profit distributions..349
A. Tri-American Partnership..349
B. Stanford Technology Trading Group, Inc..349
C. The Scitech Fund..349
D. Laser Sight..349
E. Forways..350
F. The Iranian Market..350
The Reserves..350
Table 22—6. Distributions to Reserves..350
Section 6: Where Is The Money Now..351
Table 22—7. [Who] Control[s] Unspent Entprse Funds..351
Section 7: Brunei Contribution..352
references..354
23 Other Privately Funded Covert Operations..361
The DEA Ransom Operation..361
Figure 23—1. Organization Chart of DEA..362
North continues the initiative..363
Late 1985 & early 1986: North presses on..364
The DEA agents become operational again..365
The Attorney General's role..365
Policy considerations were ignored..366
The Other Operations..366
Israel..366
The Lebanese operation..367
Other countries..367
The Erria..367
The proposed charter to the CIA for a covert operation..368
The odyssey of the Erria..368
Conclusion..369
references..370
+ Part VI Conclusions and Recommendations ch.24—28
24 Covert Action in a Democratic Society..375
What Is Covert Action?..375
Covert Action & The Law..378
Misuse of Findings..378
"Stretching" findings..379
Dispensing with Presidential findings..379
Using findings to avoid laws..380
Not Playing It Straight With Congress..381
Misleading Testimony..381
Misuse of intelligence..382
Conclusions..383
references..385
25 Powers of Congress & President in Field of Foreign Policy..387
The Witnesses' Position at the Hearings..387
The Constitutional Framework..388
The words "foreign policy" do not appear in the Constitution, and the
Constitution does not designate the President as the sole or dominant actor in
foreign policy.
The only foreign policy powers expressly granted to the Executive in
the Constitution are the powers to nominate Ambassadors, to negotiate
treaties, and to direct the Armed Forces as Commander-in-Chief. Two of
these powers are specifically conditioned on Senate approval: the Senate,
througn its power of advise and consent, can confirm or reject Ambassadors
and ratify or reject treaties.
On the other hand, the Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to regulate foreign commerce, to raise and support armies, to provide
and maintain a navy, and to declare war. Congress is given the
exclusive power of the purse. The Executive may not spend
funds on foreign policy projects except pursuant to an
appropriation by Congress.
Judicial decisions recognize a shared power..388
The Curtiss-Wright case..388
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation - Supreme Court
1936: Congress, by statute, had delegated to the President the power to
prohibit the slae of arms to countries in an area of South America if the
President believed the prohibition would promote peace. The
Curtiss-Wright Corporation claimed that the power to make this
determination was a legislative power that Congress could not delegate to
the President.
..The case involved the question of the powers of the President in
foreign policy where Congress expressly authorizes him to act; it did not
involve the questionb of the President's foreign policy powers when
Congress expressly forbids him to act.
Circumvention of Congress' Constitutional Power of the Purse..390
..allowing foreign policy to be conducted with funds supplied by private parties
and foreign governments is likely to create the expectation by the donor
nations that they can expect something in return for their largesse.
..This clandestine financing operation undermined the powers of
Congress as a coequal branch and subverted the Constitution.
Foreign Policy as a Shared Power..391
Conclusion..392
references..393
26 Boland Ammendments & the NSC Staff..395
Boland I: Sept. 27,1982, to Dec. 7, 1983..395
Limited Funding: Dec. 8, 1983, to Oct. 3, 1984..396
Boland II: Oct. 3, 1984, to Dec. 3, 1985..397
The evolution of Boland II..397
Boland II & the NSC staff..399
The meaning of "indirect" support..401
Humanitarian aid: Aug.8, 1985, to Mar.31, 1986..401
Exchange of intelligence..402
The permissibility of solicitation..403
Boland III: Dec. 4, 1985, to Oct. 17, 1986..404
Exchange of intelligence..404
Solicitation..405
Renewed assistance: Oct.18, 1986, to Sept.30, 1987..405
The Boland Amendments Were Violated in Letter & Spirit..405
..the NSC staff's ..support for the Contras was systematic and pervasive. As
the CIA had done before Boland II, the NSC staff now ran the Contra
insurgency.
..while the NSC staff started its support of the Contras at least in part
with private funds, the diversion gave it control over funds that belonged to
the United States. The profits that were skimmed were generated by the sale
of weapons belonging to the United States.
..the Administration's activities in support of the Contras were
conducted in direct contravention of the will of Congress.
It strains credulity to suggest that the President has the constitutional
prerogative to staff and fund a military operation without the knowledge of
Congress and in direct disregard of contrary legislation.
references..408
27 Rule of Law..411
SIR THOMAS MORE: The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right.
And I'll stick to what's legal..
WILLIAM ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of the law!
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the
Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on
you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted
thick with laws from coast to coast—Man's law, not God's—and if you cut them
down—and you're just the man to do it—d'you really think you could stand upright in
the winds that would blow then?
—A Man For All Seasons by Robert Bolt
Too many laws were "cut down" in the Iran—Contra Affair by officials who,
like Roper, decided that the laws inhibited pursuit of their goals.
..the Committees find that activities in the Iran—Contra Affair, including the
diversion, were conducted and later covered up by members of the NSC staff in
violation of the Constitution and of applicable laws and regulations.
Use of Donated Funds to Evade Congress' Power of the Purse..411
Overview..411
The power of the purse & the Constitution..412
..The Constitution contemplates that the Governemt will conduct
its affairs only with funds appropriated by Congress. By resorting to
funds not appropriated by Congress—indeed funds denied the executive
branch by Congress—Administration officials committed a transgression
far more basic than a violation of the Boland Amendment.
The power of the purse, which the Framers vested in Congress,
has long been recognized as "the most important single curb in the
Constitution on Presidential Power." The Framers were determined not to
combine the power of the purse and the power of the sword in the same
branch of government..
When members of the executive branch raised money from third
countries and private citizens, took control over that money through the
Enterprise, and used it to support the Contras' war in Nicaragua, they
bypassed this crucial safeguard in the Constitution.
Use of the Enterprise to mask US Gov. control of donations..413
North was responsible, directly or indirectly, for virtually all the income
of Lake Resources and the other companies in the Enterprise, and he had
the power to direct its expenditures.
Lake Resources was created for the very purpose of conducting
Government operations while evading the Congressional appropriations
power.
Legal advice..414
..the Iran-Contra Affair cannot stand as a precedent for bypassing
the constitutional requirement for appropriations. Securing funds,
without Congressional authorization, to fund Government programs run by
Government officials, is a direct violation of the Constitution that cannot
be condoned.
Section 501 of National Security Act & Related Regulation..414
The Committees find that the failure to notify the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the covert action to support the Contras
violated the Congressional notice provisions of Section 501 of the National
Security Act;
The statute provides:
The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies and other entities of the United States involved in
intelligence activities shall:
(1) keep the Select committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the
responsibility of, are engaged in by or are carried out for or on behalf of any
department, agency, or entity of the United States, ..
The Contra covert operation..415
No notice of any kind was ever sent to Congress concerning the
Contra covert action conducted by the NSC staff. On the contrary, the
NSC staff took every step to keep Congress from discovering its
activities. The covert action was carried out in violation of the
Congressional notice provisions of the National Security Act.
The Iranian Arms Sales..415
The President did know of the Iran arms sales, and he made a
deliberate decision not to notify Congress.
The DEA hostage rescue operation..416
Executive Order 12333, & NSDD 159..416
Violations of 18 USC Section 1001..416
The Diversion—Boland Amendment..416
Proceeds of Arms Sales—Funds of the US..417
The Committees find that the full proceeds of the arms sales to Iran
belong to the U.S. Government. Consequently, these funds are governed by
statutes applicable to Government funds, including statues prohibiting
conversion of U.S. Government funds to unauthorized purposes.
..Consequently, it is the Committees' judgment that all funds derived
from the proceeds of the sale of arms to Iran currently in the custody of the
Enterprise or its representatives belong to the United States and by law should
be returned to the United States Treasury forthwith.
Iran Arms Sales: Arms Export Control Act..418
The Committees find that the Administration's approval of the transfer
of weapons to Iran by Israel violated the Arms Export Control Act.
Under the AECA, the President may not provide [consent to transfer
arms] unless: (1) the United States itself would transfer those arms to that
country; (2) the transferee country (here Iran) agrees in writing that it will
not further transfer the items without obtaining the consent of the President;
and (3) the President notifies Congress of the transfer.
Violation of 18 USC Section 1505 & Presidential Records Act..419
Iran: The Presidential Records Act..419
Conclusion..419
references..421
28 Recommendations..423
1. Findings: Timely Notice..423
2. Written Findings..423
3. Disclosure of Written Findings to Congress..424
4. Findings: Agencies Covered..424
5. Findings: Identifying Participants..424
6. Findings: The Attorney General..424
7. Findings: Presidential Reporting..424
8. Recertification of Findings..424
9. Covert Actions Carried Out by Other Countries..424
10. Reporting Covert Arms Transfers..425
11. NSC Operational Activities..425
12. NSC Reporting to Congress..425
13. Privatization..425
14. Preservation of Presidential Documents..425
15. CIA Inspector General and General Counsel..425
16. Foreign Bank Records Treaties..425
17. National Security Council..426
18. Findings Cannot Supercede Law..426
19. Improving Consistency in Dealing with Security Breaches..426
20. Review of Congressional Contempt Statutes..426
21. Review of Special Compartmented Operations Within the Dept. of Defense..426
22. Review of Weapons Transfers by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff..426
23. National Security Adviser..426
24. Intelligence Oversight Board..426
25. Review of Other Laws..426
26. Recommendations for Congress..426
27. Joint Intelligence Committee..427
+ Section II: The Minority Report
The Minority Views of:
Mr. Cheney Sen. McClure
Mr. Broomfield Sen. Hatch
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Courter
Mr. McCollum
Mr. DeWine
- Part I Introduction
- Part II The Foreign Affairs Powers of the Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair
- Part III Nicaragua
- Part IV Iran
- Part V Disclosures and Investigations
- Part VI Putting Congress' House in Order
- Part VII Recommendations
- Part VIII Appendixes
+ Section III: Supplemental and Additional Views
- Sens. Inouye, Rudman..637
"...all of the Members of our Committee wish to note that, in conection with the
computer "dump" request, as with all other of our requests throughout the
investigation, the record has been one of cooperation by the White House and the
Executive Branch—a record which we hope will serve as precedent for future
Administrations."
+ Mssrs. Rodino, Fascell, Foley, Brooks, Stokes, Aspin, Boland..639
White House Computerized Documentation..639
1. PROF notes
2. Diskettes
3. Other Systems
+ Mssrs. Rodino, Fascell, Brooks, Stokes..643
Unresolved Questions, Missing Documents, Unexplored leads..643
Quite obviously, the Committees were not able definitively to answer
every question about the Iran-Contra episode, particularly with respect to the
roles of the President and his top advisers. Many of these gaps in the Report were
beyond our control; the death of CIA Director Casey, the destruction of key pieces
of evidence by Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North and his secretary, and the failure
of may witnesses to recall central events deprived us of much vital information and
made it virtually impossible completely to reconstruct what happened.
...because of President Reagan's personal commitment that the executive
branch would fully cooperate with the Committees, we did not issue subpoenas to
any person or agency in the executive branch. However, the White House itself and
a number of other executive agencies on several occasions refused to produce
documents or delayed production to such an extent that the materials could not be
reviewed in time for witness interviews or public testimony.
For example, on January 20, 1987, the Select Committees initially
requested all Department of Justice documents relating to the Iran-Contra matter.
After that request, the Committees sent at least five additional letters to the
Department prior to the Attorney General's scheduled appearance on July 28,
1987, seeking production of documents. Yet, many requested documents were still
withheld, and other material was produced only in heavily redacted form. Still
other material was made available only within days of Mr. Meese's scheduled
appearance, making preparations for his testimony difficult. It was not until July
17, 1987—two months after the public hearings began—that the House Select
Committee was given access to the Attorney General's unredacted logs and
calendars. At that time, the Committee was presented with approximately five full
boxes of materials that the Department had previously refused to produce. Among
other items, the staff review revealed:
—A handwritten log of Mr. Meese's calls on November 24, 1986, two days
after his aides had discovered the diversion memorandum and one day after his
interview with Colonel North. This log, which had not been provided at all, included
phone calls at this critical time to Donald Regan, the Vice President, Robert
McFarlane, and John Poindexter. A handwritten telephone log of Mr. Meese's calls
on November 26, 1986, was also discovered, which had been withheld. Included on
it were the following phone calls: three with Director Casey, one with Donald
Regan, one with Ross Perot and one with Judge Webster.
—Other records of phone calls that were either withheld or redacted
included Mr. Meese's phone calls with Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, Terry
Slease, Ross Perot and others.
Even after the July 17 document review, entire categories of Justice
Department documents still had not been produced. After the Committee yet again
requested the materials, the Department produced a two-foot high stack of
documents, in redacted form, on Friday night, July 24, 1987, just four days prior
to Mr. Meese's testimony.
The Actions of the Attorney General..644
NSC Involvement in Criminal Investigations..647
1. The Kelso investigation..648
2. The Miami Neutrality Act investigation..648
3. The Terrell-Robinette investigation..649
4. The Public Integrity investigation..649
+ Sens. Boren, Cohen..651
Introduction..651
Assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance..651
The Iran Initiative..652
- Sen. Heflin..655
- Sen. Boren..657
- Sen. McClure..659
+ Mr. Broomfield..661
Policy Errors..661
Mistakes in Implementation..662
Potential Improprieties and Illegalities..662
Consultation with Congress..663
Constitutional and Institutional Ramifications..663
Congressional Reaponsibility..663
Legislative Recommendations..663
- Sen. Hatch..665
- Mr. Hyde..667
- Sen. Cohen..673
- Mr. McCollum..675
- Sen. Trible..679
+ Section IV: Appendix
+ Organization and Conduct of the Committee's Investigation...683
The Establishment of Two Congressional Committees..683
A Joint Investigation..684
Organization of the investigation..684
Security..685
Public Hearings..686
Immunity..686
Proceedings relating to Swiss bank records..686
Proceedings relating to Oliver L. North..687
The Committees' Use of Computer Technology..688
Declassification..688
Fund-tracking system..688
Cooperation from the President..689
Pending request..689
Cooperation from Other Governments..690
The Committees' Report..690
Conclusion of Activities..690
+ Related Items
+ News
- IRAN-CONTRA BOOK CONCLUDES BUSH ENDORSED ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES - Aug 29 '88
Matched keyword: BUSH...GEnie news service
=START= XMT: 15:31 Mon Aug 29 EXP: 15:00 Thu Sep 01
NEW IRAN-CONTRA BOOK CONCLUDES BUSH ENDORSED ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES DEAL
WASHINGTON (AUG. 29) AP - The role of Vice President George Bush in the
Iran-Contra affair remains an important unanswered question in the presidential
campaign, according to a new book by two senators - a Democrat and a Republican
- who investigated the scandal.
The two authors, Maine senators William Cohen and George Mitchell, conclude
that the Republican nominee should have been aware that an arms-for-hostages
deal with Iran was being arranged and that he endorsed it. Cohen, a Republican,
and Mitchell, a Democrat, were members of the congressional Iran-Contra
investigating panel and the first insiders to write their own book about the
probe.
''The vice president endorsed the sale of weapons to Iran either out of loyalty
to the president or because he, too, was consumed by the passion to obtain the
freedom of the hostages,'' the two senators wrote in the book, ''Men of Zeal: A
Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings.''
Bush campaign spokeswoman Sheila Tate said there would be no immediate comment
on the book because ''we haven't seen it.''
Bush has sought to put the affair behind him, saying repeatedly that while he
nominally was President Reagan's anti-terrorism chief, he was ''out of the
loop'' on the Iran matter and didn't understand a briefing on the arrangements
he received in August 1986, more than three months before the affair became
public.
But he also has refused to talk about any discussions with Reagan about the
matter. Cohen and Mitchell write that while it is possible Bush cautioned
against the deal, evidence shows others in the administration were convinced
that the vice president supported it.
The book breaks little new ground about the hearings, but adds the perspective
of two seasoned politicians on issues such as Bush's awkward political position
as Reagan's No. 2, the mistakes made by the investigating panels in rushing the
probe to beat deadlines and negotiating with cagey defense lawyers, and the
panels' naive underestimation of how the hearings would play on television.
The senators note that no sitting vice president since Martin Van Buren in 1836
has been elected president, in part because of the conflict between the vice
president's perceived role as second in command and the reality that he usually
is relegated to the sidelines.
=END=
- REAGAN: U.S. IS NOT NEGOTIATING WITH IRAN FOR HOSTAGES IN LEBANON - Oct 1 '88
=START= XMT: 16:17 Fri Sep 30 EXP: 16:00 Sat Oct 01
REAGAN: U.S. IS NOT NEGOTIATING WITH IRAN FOR HOSTAGES IN LEBANON
CHICAGO (SEPT. 30) UPI - President Reagan disputed a report that a U.S.-Iranian secret
agreement has been negotiated to free American hostages in Lebanon, insisting Friday
that the United States is not directly or indirectly negotiating with Iran.
A report in the Israeli newspaper, ''The Nation,'' from Geneva states that the United
States and Iran have secretly worked out an agreement that if five American hostages
held in Lebanon were released by Oct. 7, a second batch of Americans, possibly including
Terry Anderson, will be freed a week later. Anderson, 38, chief Middle East
correspondent and Beirut bureau manager for The Associated Press and native of
Batavia, N.Y., was kidnapped March 16, 1985, in Beirut.
Asked about the report as he arrived in Chicago to campaign for Vice President George
Bush, Reagan said, ''We are not negotiating directly with Iran.''
Asked later if there had been any indirect contact, Reagan said: ''We're doing everything
we can to get them back. But these rumors and reports about negotiations, all I can say
is they must be coming from Iran because they are not true.''
=END=
- COURT REFUSES TO DROP CHARGES AGAINST NORTH, 2 OTHERS - Oct 1 '88
Matched keyword: IRAN-CONTRA...
=START= XMT: 13:09 Fri Sep 30 EXP: 13:00 Sat Oct 01
U.S. COURT REFUSES TO DROP CHARGES AGAINST NORTH, 2 OTHERS IN IRAN-CONTRA
CASE
WASHINGTON (SEPT. 30) UPI - A federal appeals court refused to dismiss charges
Friday against Oliver North and two other defendants in the Iran-Contra case, ruling it
lacked the power to hear their legal claims until after a trial is held.
Lawyers for North, Poindexter and Hakim had asked the appeals court to dismiss the
charges on grounds the grand jury that indicted them was improperly influenced by
testimony they gave to Congress during its 1987 hearings into the affair.
The three testified under limited immunity, which meant that statements they made
could not be used against them in the criminal investigation led by independent
prosecutor Lawrence Walsh.
The appeals court acknowledged the possibility that their Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination were violated during the probe, but said it could not review
the matter until after a trial is held in the case.
Gesell has ordered separate trials for the four men and in early July set a Sept. 20 trial
date for North. But the judge, in an order issued August 5, delayed the trial until after
the November presidential election in response to complaints from North's attorneys,
who accused the judge of being in a ''frantic rush'' to go to trial before the election.
=END=
- NORTH GETS JEERS WHILE URGING BUSINESS LEADERS TO FIGHT COMMUNISM - Oct 9 '88
OLIVER NORTH GETS JEERS WHILE URGING BUSINESS LEADERS TO FIGHT COMMUNISM
CUPERTINO, CA (OCT. 9) AP - Some 300 people turned out to jeer fired National
Security Council aide Oliver North while he urged more than 1,000 Christian
business leaders to fight the ''alien and godless philosophy'' of communism.
''I don't think (North) cares one way or another'' about protesters, admitted
rally organizer Mitch Diamond, outside an auditorium where North addressed
members of the Christian Businessmen of Silicon Valley on Saturday.
Some of the protesters dressed as a Moslem ayatollah and as President Reagan.
Many carried signs denouncing North's clandestine efforts to sell weapons to
Iran and secretly funnel profits to U.S.-backed Contra rebels battling the
leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua.
Mary Ellen Furia of nearby Los Gatos and Ethel and Jack Ballad of Saratoga
showed up with signs in support of North, who faces trial next year on 16
federal charges of conspiring to defraud the government.
''Ollie North is our man. What Congress won't do, Ollie can,'' read their
signs.
''We knew there would be protests against him, and we wanted to show we're
behind him,'' Furia said.
=END=
- NORTH'S LAWYER SIGHTS UNSWORN NATURE OF STATEMENTS TO CONGRESS - Oct 11 '88
OLIVER NORTH'S LAWYER SIGHTS INFORMAL UNSWORN NATURE OF STATEMENTS TO
CONGRESS
WASHINGTON (OCT. 11) AP - Charges that former White House aide Oliver L. North lied
about aiding Nicaraguan rebels broke a tradition against prosecuting
officials for informally misleading Congress about covert operations, defense
lawyers said Tuesday.
Until North's indictment March 16 with three other Iran-Contra co-defendants,
"no executive branch official had ever been prosecuted based on unsworn
statements to Congress," defense lawyers said in one of a series of motions to
dismiss charges against the former National Security Council aide.
Based on the wording of the statutes and the history of their enforcement,
North did not receive a "fair warning that an executive branch official or a
member of his staff would be guilty of a crime if the truth were misstated in
an unsworn communication to Congress," his attorneys said.
At issue are a series of felony charges that North misled House committees in
1985 and 1986 during inquiries about reports that the Reagan administration was
secretly helping arm the Contras when Congress banned such assistance.
None of the statements to Congress made by North were under oath, including
remarks made during an "informal off-the-record discussion" with members of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Aug. 6, 1986.
North's attorneys noted in the motion that Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles was not prosecuted in 1958 for telling lawmakers the government was not
interfering with the internal affairs of Indonesia. At the time, the CIA was
recruiting pilots to fly rebel missions against President Sukarno.
Nor were there any prosecutions resulting from false statements by the State
Department in 1960 disavowing the intelligence role of a U-2 spy plane that was
shot down over the Soviet Union, North's lawyers said.
There may be disagreement "as to whether or to what extent it is proper for
government officials to misstate or conceal the truth where a truthful
statement would jeopardize intelligence gathering or covert operations or
otherwise compromise national security," North's lawyers said.
"Until this case, however, there was no notion that such a false or misleading
statement could be criminal simply because the statement was made directly or
indirect misleading statements in letters prepared by the National Security
Council in response to queries from congressional committees.
=END=
- JUDGE DISMISSES CONSPIRACY CHARGES AGAINST NORTH ASSOCIATE - Oct 19 '88
FEDERAL JUDGE CLEARS FORMER CIA AGENT OF CONSPIRACY CHARGES
WASHINGTON (OCT. 19) AP - A federal judge Wednesday dismissed charges that a
former CIA agent participated in an illegal conspiracy to help arm the
Nicaraguan rebels but gave prosecutors a chance to bring the case anew in
Virginia.
U.S. District Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr. granted a motion by independent counsel
Lawrence Walsh to dismiss the five-count indictment against Joseph F.
Fernandez.
But the judge denied a request by the defense to prohibit Walsh from seeking to
obtain a new indictment in Virginia, where several of the alleged offenses took
place.
The defense contended that Walsh had acted improperly by bringing charges of
criminal activity in the nation's capital when four of the five alleged
offenses took place across the Potomac River in Virginia.
Robinson's order dismissing the charges against Fernandez without prejudice
leaves Walsh free to try to obtain an indictment from a federal grand jury in
Alexandria, Va.
Walsh said in his request to dismiss the case that he would seek to bring a new
indictment in Virginia.
Fernandez, 51, was indicted last June on charges that he conspired with former
National Security Council aide Oliver North and arms dealer Richard Secord to
set up a clandestine arms-supply network for the Contras in defiance of a
congressional ban on such aid.
The indictment said the conspiracy took place in Washington and elsewhere. But
Fernandez was also charged with four counts of lying to his superiors at the
CIA and the presidential commission that investigated the Iran-Contra affair.
According to the indictment that Robinson dismissed, those alleged offenses
took place at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.
The defense filed a motion to dismiss the four obstruction and false statements
charges for lack of venue. Walsh countered by asking Robinson to dismiss all
five charges to give prosecutors a chance to bring the whole case in one
jurisdiction.
Robinson, who had sharply questioned prosecutors about their tactics at an Oct.
6 hearing, gave no reason for his decision in the one-sentence order.
=END=
